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Two recent papers, Deaton (2009), and Heckman and Urzua (2009), argue against what they see as
an excessive and inappropriate use of experimental and quasi-experimental methods in empirical work
in economics in the last decade. They specifically question the increased use of instrumental variables
and natural experiments in labor economics, and  of randomized experiments in development economics.
In these comments I will make the case that this move towards shoring up the internal validity of estimates,
and towards clarifying the description of the population these estimates are relevant for, has been important
and beneficial in increasing the credibility of empirical work in economics. I also address some other









Two recent papers, Deaton (2009; Deaton from hereon), and Heckman and Urzua (2009;
HU from hereon), argue against what they see as an excessive and inappropriate use of
experimental and quasi-experimental methods in empirical work in economics in the last
decade.1 Deaton and HU reserve much of their scorn for the local average treatment
eﬀect (LATE) introduced in the econometric literature by Imbens and Angrist (1994; IA
from hereon). HU write: “Problems of identiﬁcation and interpretation are swept under
the rug and replaced by ‘an eﬀect’ identiﬁed by IV that is often very diﬃcult to interpret
as an answer to an interesting economic question,” (HU, page 19). Deaton writes: “The
LATE may, or may not, be a parameter of interest ... and in general, there is no reason
to suppose that it will be. ... I ﬁnd it hard to make any sense of the LATE. ... This goes
beyond the old story of looking for an object where the light is strong enough to see;
rather, we have control over the light, but choose to let it fall where it may, and then
proclaim that whatever it illuminates is what we were looking for all along,” (Deaton,
page 10). He also rails against the perceived laziness of these researchers by raising the
“futility of trying to avoid thinking about how and why things work,” (Deaton, page 14).2
HU wonder whether these researchers are of the opinion: “that disguising identiﬁcation
problems by a statistical pocedure is preferable to an honest discussion of the limits of
the data?” (HU, page 19).
The fact that two such distinguished economists so forcefully question trends in cur-
rent practice, may suggest to those not familiar with this literature that it is going
seriously awry. In these comments I will argue that this is not the case. Much progress
has in fact been made in empirical practice, and empirical work is much more credible
as a result of the natural experiments revolution started by Card, Angrist, Krueger, and
others in the late eighties. Starting in the late eighties their work, and more recently
that by development economists such as Banerjee, Duﬂo, and Kremer arguing in favor of
randomized experiments, has had a profound inﬂuence on empirical work. By emphasiz-
ing internal validity and study design, this literature showed the importance of looking
1The papers make similar arguments, perhaps not surprisingly given Deaton’s acknowledgement that
“much of what I have to say is a recapitulation of his [Heckman’s] arguments.” (Deaton p. 4)
2Curiously, Deaton exempts the leaders of this movement from these charges, by declaring them “too
talented to be bound by their own methodological prescriptions.” (Deaton, page 2).
[1]for clear and exogenous sources of variation in potential causes. In contrast to what
Deaton and HU suggest, this issue is distinct and separate from the choice of the models
and estimation methods used. In fact, recently there has been much interesting work
exploring the beneﬁts of randomization for identiﬁcation, estimation and assesment of
structural models. For an early example see Hausman and Wise (1979) who estimate a
model for attrition with data from randomized income maintenance experiment, and for
recent examples see Card and Hyslop (2005) who estimate a structural model of welfare
participation using experimental data from Canada, Todd and Wolpin (2003), who an-
alyze data from Mexico’s Progressa program, Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) who
estimate labor supply models exploiting random variation in unearned earnings using
data from lottery winners, Duﬂo, Hanna, and Ryan (2007) who look at the eﬀect of
monitoring and ﬁnancial incentives on teacher’s absences, and Athey, Levin and Seira
(2004) who use randomized assignment of auction formats to estimate structural models
of bidding behavior. There is much room for such work where experimental variation
is used to improve the identiﬁcation of the structural models. It would put at risk the
progress made in improving the credibility of empirical work in economics, if this message
got lost in minor squabbles about the relative merits of structural work versus work less
directly connected to economic theory, or in discussions of second-order technicalities
such as adjustments for heteroskedasticity in the calculation of standard errors and the
Behrens-Fisher problem (e.g., Deaton, page 33).3
In my view, it is helpful to separate the discussion into two parts. The ﬁrst part
concerns the questions of interest, and the second the methods conditional on the ques-
tion. In my opinion the main concern with the current trend towards credible causal
inference in general, and towards randomized experiments in particular, is that it may
lead researchers to avoid questions where randomization is diﬃcult, or even conceptually
impossible. There are many such questions, and many of them are of great importance.
Questions concerning the causal eﬀects of macro-economic policies can rarely be settled
by randomized experiments. The eﬀect of mergers and acquisitions cannot be studied
using experiments. Similarly, questions involving general equilibrium eﬀects cannot be
answered by simple experiments. In other examples randomized experimentsraise ethical
3Moreover, there is nothing in these issues that makes observational studies less vulnerable to them.
[2]concerns, and are ultimately not feasible. These are not new concerns, and I am sym-
pathetic with the comments in this regard made by, for example, Rodrik (2008). There
is clearly much room for non-experimental work, and history abounds with examples
where causality has ultimately found general acceptance without any experimental evi-
dence. The most famous example is perhaps the correlation between smoking and lung
cancer. The interpretation of this correlation as evidence of a causal eﬀect of smoking
on lung cancer is now generally accepted, without any direct experimental evidence to
support it. It would be unfortunate if the current interest in credible causal inference,
by insisting on sometimes unattainable standards of internal validity, leads researchers
to avoid such questions. At the same time, the long road towards general acceptance of
the causal interpretation of the smoking and lung cancer correlation (and Fisher’s long-
time scepticism about the causality of this correlation) shows the diﬃculties in gaining
acceptance for causal claims without randomization.
However, the importance of questions for which randomization is diﬃcult or infea-
sible, should not take away from the fact that for answering the questions they are
designed for, randomized experiments, and other what David Card calls design-based
strategies, have many advantages. Speciﬁcally, conditional on the question of interest
being one for which randomized experiment is feasible, randomized experiments are su-
perior to all other designs in terms of statistical reliability. Where as Deaton sees no
special role for experiments, Freedman, hailed by Deaton himself as “one of [the world’s]
greatest statisticians” (Deaton, title page, acknowledgement) is unambiguous in his open-
ing sentence, “Experiments oﬀer more reliable evidence on causation than observational
studies,” (Freedman, 2006, abstract) That is not to say that one may not choose to do an
observational study for other reasons, e.g., ﬁnancial costs, or ethical considerations. How-
ever, no other design will have the credibility that a randomized experiment would have.
Suppose we are interested in question that can be addressed by randomized experiments,
for example, whether a job training program has an eﬀect on labor market outcomes,
or whether class size aﬀects educational outcomes. In such settings, the evidence from
a randomized experiment is unambiguously superior to that from observational studies.
As a result, randomized experiments have often been very inﬂuential in shaping policy
debates, e.g., the 1965 Perry Preschool Project on early childhood interventions (see for
some recent discussions Holden (1990) and Manski (1997)), the National Supported Work
[3]Demonstration experiments on labor market programs (e.g., Lalonde, 1986), or Project
STAR on class size reductions (e.g., Krueger, 1999). More generally, and this is really the
key point, in a situation where one has control over the assignment mechanism, there is
little to gain, and much to lose, by giving that up through allowing individuals to choose
their own treatment regime. Randomization ensures exogeneity of key variables, where
in a corresponding observational study one would have to worry about their endogeneity.
In these comments I will make ﬁve points, from the perspective of an econometrician
who is interested in the methodological aspects of this literature. First, I will give a
diﬀerent characterization of goals and focus of the literature Deaton and HU take issue
with. For its emphasis on obtaining credible causal estimates, and for developing a clear
understanding of the nature of the variation that gives these estimates credibility, I will
refer to this as the causal literature. Second, I will discuss brieﬂy the origins of this causal
literature, which partially takes its motivation from the failure of speciﬁc structural mod-
els, such as the Heckman selection model (e.g., Heckman, 1978), to satisfactorily address
endogeneity issues in the context of estimation of causal eﬀects of labor market programs.
This was famously documented by Lalonde (1986); see also Fraker and Maynard (1987).
Third, I will argue that, in cases where the focus is establishing the existence of causal
eﬀects, and where experiments are feasible, experiments are unambiguously the preferred
approach: since Fisher (1925) it has formally been established that randomization gives
such designs a credibility unmatched by any other research design.
Fourth, I will make the case that a key contribution of the recent theoretical litera-
ture on causality has been to clarify the merits, as well as the limitations, of instrumental
variables, local average treatment eﬀects and regression discontinuity designs in settings
with heterogenous causal eﬀects. An important insight is that in settings with het-
erogenous eﬀects, instrumental variables strategies do not identify the average eﬀect of
the treatment (e.g., Heckman, 1990). However, as shown by IA instrumental variables
methods do identify the average treatment eﬀect for a well deﬁned subpopulation, the
average eﬀect for what IA call the compliers. Although in many cases the local average
treatment eﬀects, and similarly the estimands in regression discontinuity designs, are
not the average eﬀects that researchers set out to estimate, the internal validity of those
estimands is often much higher than that of other estimands. I will also take issue with
the Deaton and HU view that somehow instrumental variables methods are atheoretical.
[4]The exclusion restrictions that underly such methods are motivated by subject matter,
that is economic, rather than statistical, knowledge. Moreover, the focus on instrumen-
tal variables estimands, rather than on reduced form correlations between outcomes and
exogenous variables (including instruments), is motivated by the belief that the former
are more likely to be invariant, or structural, than the latter, that is, are more likely to
generalize to other settings.
In the ﬁfth point, I discuss issues related to external validity, that is, the ability of
the estimands to generalize to other populations and settings. The causal literature has
emphasized internal validity over external validity, with the view that a credible estimate
of the average eﬀect for a subpopulation is preferred to an estimate of the average for the
overall population with little credibility. This is consistent with the biomedical literature.
Although the primacy of internal validity over external validity has been criticizedin that
literature, there is little support for moving towards a system where studies with low
internal validity receive much weight in policy decisions. External validity is generally
a bigger problem in economics than in biomedical settings, with substantial variation
in both preferences and constraints between individuals, as well as variation over time.
Understanding variation in treatment eﬀects is therefore of great importance in these
settings, and it has received a fair amount of attention in the experimental literature
(e.g., Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2008).
2 Causal Models and Design-Based Approaches
The literature that does not conform to the Deaton and HU standards of structural work
is variously referred to, in a somewhat pejorative manner, as reduced-form, atheoretical,
or statistical (as opposed to economic). These are not terms commonly used in this liter-
ature itself. They are also at odds with their historical use.4 In the classical simultaneous
equations setting, the reduced form is used to refer to the regression of the endogenous
variables on the full set of exogenous variables (which is typically estimated by ordinary
least squares), not to equations estimated by instrumental variables methods. The almost
complete lack of instrumental variables methods in the statistical literature makes that
4In an even more remarkable attempt to shape the debate by changing terminology, Deaton proposes
to redeﬁne exogeneity in a way that allows for the possibility that a randomly generated number is not
exogenous with respect to economic behavior.
[5]label also inappropriate for the literature that Deaton and HU focus on in their criticism.
What is shared by this literature is not so much a lack of theoretical or economic motiva-
tion, but rather an explicit emphasis on credibly estimating causal eﬀects, a recognition
of the heterogeneity in these eﬀects, clarity in the identifying assumptions, and a concern
about endogeneity of choices and the role study design plays. I will therefore refer to
this interchangeably as the causal, or design-based literature. Early inﬂuential examples
include the Card (1990) study of the impact of immigration using the Mariel boatlift,
Angrist’s (1990) study of the eﬀect of veteran status on earnings using the Vietnam era
draft lottery as an instrument, and the Angrist and Krueger (1991) study of the eﬀect of
education on earnings using variation in educational achievement related to compulsory
schooling laws. More recently this has led to many studies using regression discontinuity
designs. See Lee and Lemieux (2009) for a review. The recent work in development
economics has taken the emphasis on internal validity even further, stressing formal ran-
domization as a systematic and robust approach to obtaining credible causal eﬀects (e.g.,
Duﬂo, Glennerster, and Kremer, 2008). This has led to a spectacular increase in exper-
imental evaluations in development economics (see for example the many experiments
run by researchers associated with the Poverty Action Lab at MIT), and in many other
areas in economics, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Duﬂo and Saez (2003), and
many others.
Often the focus is on causal eﬀects of binary interventions or treatments. See Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009) for a recent review of the methodological part of this literature.
Even if simple average eﬀects of these interventions are not directly the answering ques-
tions about plausible economic policies, they are often closely related to the eﬀects of
such policies, and therefore viewed as quantities of interest. A major concern in this
literature is that simple comparisons between economic agents in the various regimes are
often not credible as estimates of the average eﬀects of interest, because the assignment
to a particular regime was partly the result of choices by optimizing agents. As a con-
sequence, great care is applied to the problem of ﬁnding credible sources of exogenous
variation in the receipt of the intervention of interest, often in combination with the
innovative collection of original data sources.
To focus the discussion, let me introduce a speciﬁc example. Suppose a state, say
California, is considering reducing class size in ﬁrst through fourth grade by 10%. En-
[6]tering in the California policymakers’ decision is the a comparison of the cost of such a
class size reduction with its beneﬁts. Suppose that the policymakers have accurate infor-
mation regarding the cost of the program, but are unsure about the beneﬁts. Ultimately
the hope is that such a reduction would improve labor market prospects of the students,
but let us suppose that the state views the program as worthwhile if it improves some
measure of skills, say measured as a combination of test scores, by some amount. What
is the relevance for this decision of the various estimates available in the literature? Let
us consider some of the studies of the eﬀect of class size on educational outcomes. There
is a wide range of such studies, but let me focus on a few. First, there is experimental
evidence, from the Tennessee STAR experiments starting in 1985 (e.g., Krueger, 1999).
Second, there are estimates based on regression discontinuity designs using Israeli data
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999). Third, there are estimates exploiting natural variation in class
size arising from natural variation in cohort size, using data from Connecticut in Hoxby
(2000). None of these estimates directly answers the question facing the decisionmakers
in California. So, are any of these three studies useful for informing our California policy
maker? In my view all three are. In all three cases ﬁnding positive eﬀects of class size
reductions on test scores would move my prior beliefs on the eﬀect in California towards
bigger eﬀects. Exactly how much each of the three studies would change my prior beliefs
would depend on the external and internal validity of the three studies. Speciﬁcally,
the external validity of each study would depend on (i) its timing to the studies relative
to the target program, with older studies receiving less weight, (ii) diﬀerences between
the study population and the California target population, including the targed grade
levels in each study, (iii) diﬀerences between the study outcomes and the goals of the
California programs. In terms of these criteria the Connecticut study would do best. In
terms of internal validity, that is, of the estimate having a credible causal interpretation,
the experimental Tennessee study and, next, the Israeli study would do better. The
main point, though, is that all three studies are in my view useful. None of the three
answers directly the question of interest, but the combination is considerably better than
any single one. We could clearly do better, if we designed a study especially to study
the California question. Ideally we would run an experiment in California itself, which,
ﬁve years later, might give us a much more reliable answer, but it would not help the
policy makers at this moment very much. If we did an observational study in California,
[7]however, I would still put some weight on the Connecticut, Tenessee and Israeli studies.
One may go further in formalizing the decision process in this case, and I will do so in
Section 6.
Reiterating the main point, having a variety of estimates, with a range of populations,
and a range of identiﬁcation strategies, can be useful to policy makers even if none of the
individual studies directly answers the policy question of interest. It is of course unrealis-
tic to expect that the California policy makers would be able to pick a single study from
the literature, in order to get an answer to a question that had not actually been posed
yet when these studies were conducted. This is, again, not a new point. The proponents
of randomization in the new development economics have argued persuasively in favor of
doing multiple experiments (Duﬂo, 2004; Banerjee 2007, Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2008). It
is obvious that, as Deaton comments, simply repeating the same experiment would not
be very informative. However, conducting experiments on a variety of settings, including
diﬀerent populations, and diﬀerent economic circumstances, would be. As Deaton sug-
gests, informing these settings by economic theory, much as the original negative income
tax experiments were, would clearly improve our understanding of the processes, as well
as our ability to inform public policy.
The focus of the causal literature has been on shoring up the internal validity of the
estimates, and on clarifying the nature of the population these estimates are relevant
for. This is where instrumental variables, local average treatment eﬀects, and regression
discontinuitymethods come in. These often do not answer exactly the question of interest.
As a result, a single estimate is unlikely to provide a deﬁnitive and comprehensive basis
for informing policy. Rather, the combination of several such studies, based on diﬀerent
populations and in diﬀerent settings, can give guidance on the nature of interventions
that work.
Let me mention one more example. Deaton cites a study by Banerjee, Duﬂo, Cole,
and Linden (2007) who ﬁnd diﬀerences in average eﬀects between randomized evaluations
of the same program in two locations. Banerjee et al surmise that these diﬀerences are
related to diﬀerential initial reading abilities. Deaton dismisses this conclusion as not
justiﬁed by the randomization, because that question was not part of the original protocol
and would therefore be subject to data mining issues. This is formally correct, but it is
precisely the attempt to understand diﬀerences in the results of past experiments, that
[8]leads to further research and motivates subsequent experiments, thus building a better
understanding of the heterogeneity in the eﬀects that can assist in informing policy. See
for another example of such a meta analysis Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009), and for
additional discussion Section 6.
3 Lalonde (1986): The Failure of Non-experimental
Methods to Replicate Experimental Evaluations of
Labor Market Programs
Surprisingly, neither Deaton nor HU discuss in much detail the origins of the resurgence
of interest in randomized and natural experiments, and the concern with the internal
validity of some of the structural modelling. HU vaguely reference the “practical diﬃculty
in identifying, and precisely estimating the full array of structural parameters” (HU, page
2), but mention only an unreferenced paper by Hausman (presumably Hausman, 1981)
as one of the papers that according to HU “fueled the ﬂight of many empirical economists
from structural models” (HU, page 2, footnote 6). I think the origins behind this ﬂight
are not quite as obscure as may appear from reading Deaton and HU. A major role was
played by Lalonde’s landmark 1986 paper, “Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of
Training Programs with Experimental Data.” In this paper, widely cited, and still widely
taught in labor and econometrics courses in economics PhD programs, Lalonde studies
the ability of a number of econometric methods, including Heckman’s selection models, to
replicate the results from an experimental evaluation of a labor market program, on the
basis of non-experimental data. He concluded that they could not do so systematically.
Lalonde’s evidence, and subsequent conﬁrmations of his conclusions, e.g., Fraker and
Maynard (1987), had a profound impact in the economics literature, and even played
a role in inﬂuencing Congress to mandate experimental evaluations for many federally
funded programs.
It is diﬃcult to argue that the focus in Lalonde’s study, the average eﬀect of the
Nationally Supported Work (NSW) program, is not “useful for policy or understanding,”
(Deaton, Abstract). The most direct evidence that it meets this criterion is the willing-
ness of policy makers to provide substantial funds for credible evaluations of similar labor
market and educational programs. Nevertheless, the question therefore arises whether
[9]evaluation methods other than those considered by Lalonde would have led to better
results. There is some evidence that matching methods would have done better. See
the inﬂuential paper by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), although this is still disputed, e.g.,
Smith and Todd (2005). See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a recent review. Match-
ing methods, however, hardly meet Deaton’s criteria for “analysis of models inspired by
economic theory” (Deaton, page 2). Until there are more succesful attempts to replicate
experimental results, it would therefore seem inescapable that there is a substantial role
to be played by experimental evaluations in this literature if we want data analyses to
meet Leamer’s standard of being taken seriously by other researchers.
4 The Beneﬁts of Randomized Experiments
One of the most curious discussions in Deaton concerns the merits of randomized exper-
iments. He writes: “I argue that evidence from randomized experiments has no special
priority. ... Randomized experiments cannot automatically trump other evidence, they
do not occupy any special place in some hierarchy of evidence,” (Deaton, page 4). These
are remarkable statements. If true, in the unqualiﬁed way Deaton states them, it would
throw serious doubt on the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) insistence on ran-
domized evaluations of new drugs and treatments. But of course Deaton’s statements are
wrong. Deaton is both formally wrong, and wrong in spirit. Randomized experiments
do occupy a special place in the hierarchy of evidence, namely at the very top.5
Formally, as shown originally by Fisher (1925), randomization allows the researcher
to precisely quantify the uncertainty associated with the evidence for an eﬀect of a treat-
ment. Speciﬁcally, it allows for the calculation of exact p-values of sharp null hypotheses.
These p-values are free of assumptions on distributions of outcomes, assumptions on the
sampling process, or assumptions on interactions between units, solely relying on ran-
domization and a sharp null hypothesis. No other design allows for this. Now this is
strictly speaking a very narrow result, with subtle extensions to more interesting ques-
tions. We can establish the presence of a causal eﬀect through the calculation of p-values,
but we cannot estimate the average eﬀect without some additional assumptions. Unless
we rule out interactions, the average eﬀect depends on assignments to other individuals
5See the earlier quote by Freedman.
[10]and thus needs to be deﬁned carefully. In the absence of interactions we can estimate
the average eﬀect without bias, but the validity of conﬁdence intervals still relies on
large sample approximations (e.g., Neyman, 1923; Freedman, 2008). Nevertheless, even
if experiments rely on some assumptions for inference on average treatment eﬀects, they
do so to a lesser extent than observational studies, by not requiring assumptions on the
assignment mechanism.
Deaton himself hedges his remarkable claims, by adding that “actual experiments
are frequently subject to practical problems that undermine any claims to statistical or
epistemic superiority,” (Deaton, abstract), a somewhat confusing statement given that
according to his earlier comments there is no initial superiority to undermine. It is
obviously true that violations of assignment protocols, missing data, and other practical
problems, create complications in the analyses of data from randomized experiments.
There is no evidence, however, that giving up control of the assignment mechanism, and
conducting an observational study, improves these matters. Moreoever, the suggestion
that any complication, such as a violation of the assignment protocol, leads to analyses
that lose all credibility accorded to randomized experiments is wrong. Again, it is both
formally wrong, and wrong in substance. That this suggestion is formally wrong is
easiest illustrated in an example. Consider a randomized experiment with 2N units,
N randomly assigned to the treatment group, and the remaining N assigned to the
control group. Suppose we wish to test the sharp Fisher null hypothesis that there is no
causal eﬀect whatsoever of a job search assistance program on employment status. For
such an experiment we can calculate the exact p-values using Fisher’s methods. Now
suppose that there is noncompliance. Some individuals assigned to the program, did
not participate in the program, and some assigned to the control group, did in fact
participate in the program. Let Y ∗
i ∈ {0,1} be the outcome we would have observed for
individual i, had this individual been exposed to the treatment assigned to her. Let Ci
be an indicator for compliance with the treatment received, and let Wi be the treatment
assigned. The complete data p-value pcomp can be written as a function the complete
data, pcomp = p(Y∗,W), where Y∗ and W are the 2N vectors with typical element Y ∗
i
and Wi respectively. The problem is that we do not observe Y ∗
i if Ci = 0 (the individual
does not comply with the treatment assigned). However, even in that case we know
that Y ∗
i ∈ {0,1}. Hence we can derive, in the spirit of the work by Manski (1990,
[11]1994, 2003), the range of p-values consistent with the observed data, without making
any assumptions whatsoever about the nature of the noncompliance. Depending on the
data, we may therefore be able to conclude, in spite of the noncompliance, that we can
be conﬁdent that the treatment did have some eﬀect. The point is that in settings with
limited noncompliance we can still make precise statements of the type validated by
randomized experiments, with no additional assumptions. An important role is played
here by Manski’s insight that identiﬁcation is not a matter of all or nothing. Thus,
some of the beneﬁts of randomization formally remain even in the presence of pratical
complications.
In his paper Deaton also questions what we learn from experiments: “One immediate
consequence of this derivation is a fact that is often quoted by critics of RCTs, but
is often ignored by practitioners, at least in economics: RCTs are informative about
the mean of the treatment eﬀects, Yi1 − Yi0 , but do not identify other features of the
distribution. For example, the median of the diﬀerence is not the diﬀerence in medians,
so an RCT is not, by itself, informative about the median treatment eﬀect, something
that could be of as much interest to policy makers as the mean treatment eﬀect.” Deaton
is correct in stating that experiments are not informative about the median treatment
eﬀect. As a side issue, this raises the question, of course, how any study can be, other
than by making untestable assumptions, but let me ignore that question. The more
important issue is the second claim in the Deaton quote. In many cases average eﬀects
on (functions of) outcomes are indeed what is of interest to policy makers, not quantiles
of diﬀerences in potential outcomes. The key insight is that a social planner, maximizing
a welfare function that depends on the distribution of outcomes in each state of the world,
would only care about the two marginal distributions, not about the distribution of the
diﬀerence. Suppose that the planner’s choice is between two programs. In that case
the social planner would look at the welfare given the distribution of outcomes induced
by the ﬁrst program, and compare that to the welfare induced by the second program.
As Manski (1996) writes, “Thus, a planner maximizing a conventional social welfare
function wants to learn P[Y (1)] and P[Y (0)], not P[Y (1) − Y (0)].”(Manski, 1996, page
714). (Here P[Y (w)] denotes the distribution of Y (w).) The decision may depend on the
median of the marginal distributions of Yi(0) and Yi(1), but would in general not depend
on the median of the treatment eﬀect Yi(1) − Yi(0).
[12]Deaton also raises issues concerning the manner in which data from randomized exper-
iments are analyzed in practice. Consider a carefully designed randomized experiment,
with covariates present that were not taken into account in the randomization.6 Deaton
raises three issues. The ﬁrst concerns inference, or estimation of standard errors. The
second is concerned with ﬁnite sample biases. The third issue deals with speciﬁcation
search and the exploration of multiple hypotheses. I will address each in turn. Before
doing so, note, however, that although Deaton raises these issues in the context of ex-
perimental evaluations, there is nothing speciﬁc to randomized experiments that makes
them more vulnerable to these issues than observational studies. Moreoever, in my view
these three are second order issues. That is, second order relative to the ﬁrst order is-
sues of selection and endogeneity in observational evaluation studies that have long been
highlighted by Heckman (e.g., Heckman, 1978; Heckman and Robb, 1985).
First, the standard errors. This is an issue even in large samples. If the average eﬀect
is estimated as the diﬀerence in means by treatment status, the appropriate variance,
validated by the randomization, is the robust one, allowing for heteroskedasticity. Using
the standard ols variance based on homoskedasticity leads to conﬁdence intervals that
are not necessarily justiﬁed even in large samples. This is correct, and in practice it is
certainly recommended to use the robust variance here. Moroever, the standard error
issue that is often the biggest concern in practice, clustering, is nowadays routinely taken
into account. See Duﬂo, Glennerster, and Kremer (2008) for more discussion.
The second issue concerns ﬁnite sample issues. Researchers often include covariates
in regression estimates of average treatment eﬀect. In randomized experiments this is not
strictly necessary. Because the covariates are in expectation uncorrelated with the treat-
ment indicator, the standard omitted variable bias argument implies that their omission
or inclusion does not introduce any asymptotic bias. In ﬁnite samples including covari-
ates can introduce some bias, because the ﬁnite sample correlation between the treatment
indicator and the covariates need not equal zero, even if the population correlation does.
On the other hand, including covariates can substantially improve the precision if these
covariates are good predictors of the outcomes given or without the treatment. In ﬁnite
samples there is therefore a tradeoﬀ between some ﬁnite sample bias, and large sample
6In fact one would always, even in small samples be at least as well oﬀ by stratiﬁcation on these
covariates, e.g., Imbens, King, McKenzie, and Ridder (2009).
[13]precision gains. In practice including some covariates that are a priori believed to be
substantially correlated with the outcomes, is likely to improve the expected squared
error. An additional point is that if the regression model is saturated, e.g., with a bi-
nary covariate including both the covariate and the interaction of the covariate and the
treatment indicator, there is no bias, even in ﬁnite samples.7
The third issue Deaton raises concerns the exploration of multiple speciﬁcations,
for example through the estimation of average eﬀects for various subgroups. This is
formally correct, and I would certainly encourage researchers to follow more closely the
protocols established by the FDA, which, for example, insists on listing the analyses to
be conducted prior to the collection of the data. Again there is of course nothing speciﬁc
to randomized experiments in this arguments: any time a researchers uses pre-testing,
or estimates multiple versions of a statistical model there should be concern that the
ﬁnal conﬁdence intervals no longer have the nominal coverage rate. However, I think
that this is again a second order issue. In randomized experiments one typically ﬁnds,
as in Lalonde (1986), that the results from a range of estimators and speciﬁcations are
robust. Had Deaton added a real example of a case where results based on experiments
were sensitive to these issues, his argument would have been more convincing.
Ultimately, and this is really the key point, it seems diﬃcult to argue that, in a setting
where it is possible to carry out a randomized experiment, one would ever beneﬁt from
giving up control over the assignment mechanism, by allowing individuals to choose their
own treatment status. In other words, conditional on the question, the methodological
case for randomized experimentsseems unassailable, and none of the arguments advanced
by Deaton and HU weaken that. I do not want to say that in practice randomized
experiments are generally perfect, or that their implementation cannot be improved, but
I do want to make the claim that given up control over the assignment process is unlikely
to improve matters. It is telling that neither Deaton nor HU give a speciﬁc example
where an observational study did improve, or would have improved, on a randomized
experiment, conditional on the question lending itself to a randomized experiment.
7A separate issue is that it is diﬃcult to see how ﬁnite sample concerns could be used as an argument
against actually doing experiments. There are even fewer observational settings for which we have exact
ﬁnite sample results.
[14]5 Instrumental Variables, Local Average Treatment
Eﬀects, and Regression Discontinuity Designs
In some settings a randomized experiment would have been feasible, or at least conceiv-
able, but was not actually conducted. This may have been the result of ethical consider-
ations, or because there was no particularly compelling reason to conduct an experiment.
In some of those cases, credible evaluations can be based on instrumental variables or
regression discontinuity strategies. As a rule, such evaluations are second best to ran-
domized experiments for two reasons. First, they rely on additional assumptions, and
second, they have less external validity. Often, however, such evaluations are all we have.
The theoretical econometrics literature in the last two decades has clariﬁed what we can
learn, and under what conditions, about the intervention in those settings.8 In doing so,
this literature has made many connections to the statistics and psychology literature on
observational studies. Rather than leading to “unnecessarily rhetorical barriers between
disciplines” (Deaton, page 2), this has been a remarkably eﬀective two-way exchange,
leading to substantial convergence in the statistics and econometrics literatures, both
in terms of terminology and in the exchange of ideas. On the one hand, economists
have now generally adopted Rubin’s potential outcome framework (Rubin, 1973, 1990;
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), labeled the Rubin Causal Model by Holland (1986), which
formulates causal questions as comparisons of unit-level potential outcomes.9 Although
this framework is a substantial departure from the Cowles Commission general set up
of simultaneous equations models, it is closely related to the interpretation of structural
equations in, for example, Haavelmo (1943). On the other hand, statisticians gained
an appreciation for, and understanding of, instrumental variables methods. See for ex-
ample, what is probably the ﬁrst use of instrumental variables published in the main-
stream medical literature, although still written by economists, McClellan and Newhouse
(1994). Special cases of these methods had been used previously in the biostatistics lit-
erature, in particular in settings of randomized experiments with one-sided compliance
(e.g., Zelen, 1979), but no links to the econometrics literature had been made. Further-
more economists signiﬁcantly generalized applicability and understanding of regression
8For a recent review of this literature, see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
9Compare for example, the set up in Heckman and Robb (1985) with that in Heckman (1990).
[15]discontinuity designs (Hahn, Todd, and VanderKlaauw, 2001), which originated in the
psychology literature. See Shadish, Campbell and Cook (2000), and Cook (2008) for a
historical perspective. Within economics, however, the results in IA and Hahn, Todd,
and VanderKlaauw (2001) are unusual. As a consequence these papers have generated a
substantial degree of controversy, as echoed in the quotes from Deaton and HU. Let me
oﬀer some comments on this.
The standard approach in econometrics is to state precisely, at the outset of an analy-
sis, what is the object of interest. Let me use Angrist’s (1989) famous draft lottery study
as an example. In that case one may be interested in the average causal eﬀect of serving
in the military on earnings. Now suppose one is concerned that simple comparisons be-
tween veterans and non-veterans are not credible as estimates of average causal eﬀects
because of unobserved diﬀerences between veterans and nonveterans. Let us consider
the arguments advanced by Angrist in support of using the draft lottery number as an
instrument. The ﬁrst key assumption is that draft eligibility is exogenous. Since it was
actually randomly assigned, this is true by design in this case. The second is that there
is no direct eﬀect of the instrument, the lottery number, on the outcome. This is what
Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) call the exclusion restriction.10 This is a substantive
assumption that may well be violated. See Angrist (1990) and Angrist, Imbens, and Ru-
bin (1996) for discussions of potential violations. The third assumption is what IA call
monotonicity, which requires that any man who would serve if not draft eligible, would
also serve if draft eligible.11 In this setting monotonicity seems a very reasonable assump-
tion. See Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin for discussions of the implications of violations of
this assumption.
These three assumptions are not suﬃcient to identify the average eﬀect of serving
in the military for the full population. However, we can identify the average eﬀect on
the subpopulation of what Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) call compliers. Compliers
in this context are individuals who were induced by the draft lottery to serve in the
military, as opposed to never-takers who would not serve irrespective of their lottery
number, and always-takers, who would volunteer irrespective of their lottery number.
10Deaton actually calls this second assumption “exogeneity”, in an unnecessary and confusing change
from conventional terminology
11In another unnecessary attempt to change established terminology HU argue that this should be
called “uniformity.”
[16]But, Deaton might protest, this is not what we said we were interested in! That may
be correct, depending on what is the policy question. One could imagine that the policy
interest is in compensating those who were involuntarily taxed by the draft, in which case
the compliers are exactly the population of interest. If, on the other hand the question
concerns future drafts that may be more universal than the Vietnam era one, the overall
population may be the closer to the population of interest. In that case there are two
alternatives that do focus on the average eﬀect for the full population. Let us brieﬂy
discuss both in order to motivate the case for reporting the local average treatment
eﬀect. See also Manski (1996) for a discussion of these issues.
One principled approach is Manski’s (1990, 1996, 2003) bounds, or partial identiﬁca-
tion, approach. Manski might argue that one should maintain the focus on the overall
average eﬀect, and derive the bounds on this estimand given the assumptions one is
willing to make. Manski’s is a coherent perspective, and a useful one. While I have no
disagreement with the case for reporting the bounds on the overall average treatment
eﬀect, there is in my view a strong case for also reporting estimates for the subpopula-
tion for which one can identify the average eﬀect of interest, that is the local average
treatment eﬀect. The motivation for this is that there may be cases with wide bounds
on the population average, some of which are, and some of which are not, informative
about the presence of any eﬀects. Consider an example of a randomized evaluation of a
drug on survival, with one-sided noncompliance, and with the randomized assignment as
an instrument for receipt of treatment. Suppose the bounds for the average eﬀect of the
treatment are equal to [−1/4,1/4]. This can be consistent with a substantial negative
average eﬀect for compliers, lowering survival rates by 1/8, or with a substantial positive
average eﬀect for compliers, raising survival rates by 1/8.12 In both examples there need
not be any statistical evidence that the eﬀect diﬀers for compliers and nevertakers. One
would think that in the ﬁrst case a decision maker would be considerably less likely to
implement universal adoption of the treatment than in the second, and so reporting only
12To be speciﬁc, let the probability of complier and never-takers be equal to 1/2. With the endogenous
regressor (receipt of treatment) denoted by Xi, and the instrument (assignment of treatment) denoted
by Zi, let pzx = pr(Y = 1|X = x,Z = z). In the ﬁrst example, p00 = 3/8, p10 = 1/4, and p11 = 1/4. In
the second example ˜ p00 = 1/8, ˜ p10 = 1/4, and ˜ p11 = 1/4. Now in both cases the sharp bounds on the
average treatment eﬀect are [−1/4,1/4], in the ﬁrst example τlate = −1/8, and in the second example
˜ τlate = 1/8.
[17]the bounds might leave out relevant information.
A second alternative approach to the focus on the local average treatment eﬀect is to
complement the three assumptions that allowed for identiﬁcation of the average eﬀect for
compliers, with additional assumptions that allow one to infer the overall average eﬀect,
at least in large samples. The concern is that the assumptions that allow one to carry
out this extrapolation are of a very diﬀerent nature from, and may be less credible than,
those that identify the local average treatment eﬀect. For that reason I would prefer to
keep those assumptions separate, and report both the local average treatment eﬀect, with
its high degree of internal, but possibly limited external validity, and possibly add a set
of estimates for the overall average eﬀect with the corresponding additional assumptions,
with lower internal, but higher external, validity. Let us be more speciﬁc in the context of
the Angrist study. One might write down a model for the outcome (earnings), depending
on veteran status:
Yi = α + β · Vi + εi.
In addition one might write down a Heckman-style latent index model (Heckman, 1978;




i = π0 + π1 · Zi + ηi.
The latent index V ∗
i represents the diﬀerence in utility from serving, versus not serving,
in the military with the observed veteran status equal to
Vi =
￿
1 if V ∗
i > 0,
0 if V ∗
i ≤ 0.
The inclusion of the instrument Zi in the utility function can be thought of as reﬂecting
the cost a low lottery number imposes on the action of not servingin the military. Suppose
that the only way to stay out of the military if drafted is through medical exemptions.
In that case it may well be plausible that the instrument is valid. Health status is
captured by the unobserved component ηi: individuals in poor health ηi < −π0 − π1
(nevertakers in the AIR terminology) would not serve even if drafted, and individuals
with −π0 − π ≤ ηi < −π0 (compliers) would serve if drafted, but not as volunteers, and
[18]individuals with −π0 ≤ ηi (alwaystakers) would always serve.13
Although not widely used anymore, this type of model was very popular in the eight-
ies, as one of the ﬁrst generation of models that explicitly took into account selection bias
(Heckman, 1978, 1990) Note that this model embodies all the substantive assumption
underlying the local average treatment eﬀect. Thus, the instrumental variables estimator
can be justiﬁed by reference to this, admittedly simple, structural model.
Although originally this type of model was often used with a distributional assumption
(typically joint normality of (ηi,εi)), this is not essential in this version of the model.
Without any distributional assumptions, only assuming independence of εi and Zi is
suﬃcient for identyﬁng the average eﬀect of military service, β. More important is the
assumption of a constant eﬀect of veteran status. Such an assumption is rarely implied
by theory, and is often implausible on substantive grounds (e.g., with binary outcomes).
Suppose we relax the model and explicitly allow for heterogenous eﬀects:
Yi = α + (β + νi) · Vi + εi,
where νi captures the heterogeneity in the eﬀect of veteran status for individual i. If we
maintain joint normality (now of the triple (εi,ηi,νi)), we can still identify the parameters
of the model, including β, that is, the average eﬀect of veteran status. See for example,
Bj¨ orklund and Moﬃtt (1987). Unlike in the constant eﬀect model, however, in this case
the normality assumption is not innocuous. As Heckman (1990) shows, a nonparametric
version of this model is not identiﬁed, unless the probability of veteran status, as a
function of the instrument Zi, is arbitrarily close to zero and one for some choices of the
instrument. As this is implied by the range of the instrument being unbounded, this
is often referred to as “identiﬁcation at inﬁnity” (Chamberlain, 1986; HU). In the case
with a binary instrument, this assumption is easy to check. In the Angrist study, the
probability of serving in the military for the draft eligible and non-eligible is far from
zero and one, and so nonparametric identiﬁcation fails. The contribution of the LATE
literature was the insight that, although one could not identify the average eﬀect for
the overall population, one could still identify the average eﬀect for compliers. In the
structural model above, compliersare the individuals with π0−π1 ≤ ηi < π0. Think again
13There are also arguments why the instrument need not be valid. For example, individuals may avoid
the draft by enrolling in additional education to receive educational deferments. See Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin (1996) for more discussion.
[19]of the case where the nevertakers with ηi < −π0 − π1 correspond to individuals in poor
health. These individuals cannot be induced to serve in the military through the draft.
It seems intuitively clear that we cannot identify the average eﬀect of military service for
this group from such data, because we never see them serving in the military. So, the
problem in this case is not so much that researchers are “trying to avoid thinking about
how and why things work,” (Deaton, page 14), but that there is little basis for credible
extrapolation from the local average treatment eﬀect to the overall average eﬀect.
Reporting the local average treatment eﬀect, solely, or in combination with bounds
or point estimates for the overall average based on additional assumptions, is thus em-
phatically not motivated by a claim that the local average treatment eﬀect is the sole or
primary eﬀect of interest. Rather, it is motivated by a sober assessment that estimates for
other subpopulations do not have the same internal validity, and by an attempt to clarify
what can be learned from the data in the absence of identiﬁcation of the population
average eﬀect. It is based on a realization that, because of heterogeneity in responses,
instrumental variables estimates are a distinct second best to randomized experiments.
Let me end this discussion with a ﬁnal comment on the substantive importance of what
we learn in such settings. Although we do not learn what the average eﬀect is of veteran
status, we can, in suﬃciently large samples, learn for a particular, well-deﬁned subpopu-
lation, learn what the eﬀect is. We may then wish to extrapolate to other subpopulations,
even if only qualitatively, but given that the nature of those extrapolations is often sub-
stantially less credible than the inferences for the particular subpopulation, it may be
useful to keep these separate.
These arguments are even more relevant for the regression discontinuity case. In
the sharp regression discontinuity case we learn about the average eﬀect of a treatment
at a ﬁxed value of the covariate. Let us consider Lee’s (2008) example of the eﬀect
of incumbency on election outcomes. Lee uses comparisons of congressional districts
where the previous election was barely won by a Democrat with districts where the
previous election was barely wone by a Republican. This leads to estimates of the eﬀect
of incumbency that have a high degree of internal validity, but that only apply to districts
with close elections. These may well be very diﬀerent from districts that are heavily
leaning to one party. There is little reason to believe that districts with close elections
are the only ones of interest, but in the absence of credible models for extrapolation, this
[20]is again all we can do.
Fuzzy regression discontinuity designs rank even lower in terms of external validity.
As pointed out by Hahn, Todd, and VanderKlaauw (2001), in arguably the most impor-
tant contribution of economists to the regression discontinuity design literature, fuzzy
regression discontinuity designs combine the limitations of sharp regression discontinu-
ity designs, in that they only refer to units with a particular value of the covariates,
with those of instrumental variables estimates, in that they only reﬂect on compliers.
However, for this subpopulation, these designs often have great internal validity. Many
convincing examples have now been published. See the survey paper by Lee and Lemieux
(2009) and the special issue of the journal of econometrics (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
Again, researchers do not necessarily set out to estimate the average for these particu-
lar subpopulations, but in the face of the lack of internal validity of estimates for other
subpopulations they choose to report estimates for them.
6 Internal versus External Validity
Much of the debate ultimately centers on the weight researchers put on external validity
versus internal validity of estimators. There is no disagreement that both are important.
See Banerjee and Duﬂo (2008) for a recent discussion in the context of experimental
evaluations in development economics. Returning to the class size example from Section
2, Angrist and Lavy (1999), Hoxby (2000), and Krueger (1999) do not study the eﬀect
of class size as a historical phenomenon: they want to inform the policy debate on
class size. Similarly, Card (1990) is presumably not interested in soley in the eﬀect
of the Mariel boatlift, rather he is interested in informing the debate on the eﬀects of
immigration of low-skilled workers. In order to be useful in informing policy, a study
needs to have internal validity (have a credible causal interpretation for the population it
refers to) as well as external validity (be relevant for the populations the treatment may
be extended to). In many disciplines the weights placed on diﬀerent studies are heavily
loaded in favor of internal validity. The FDA insists on elaborate protocols to ensure
the internal validity of estimates, with much less emphasis on their external validity.
This has led, at times, to the approval of treatments with a subsequent reversal of that
decision, after the treatment was found to have adverse eﬀects on populations that were
[21]underrepresented in the original study populations. Part of this is unavoidable. First,
randomized experiments can only be conducted on volunteers, and there is no systematic
method for ensuring that the population of volunteers is representative of the population
of interest. Second, after a succesful randomized experiment, the target population may
well change. If a treatment is in a trial very succesful for moderately sick patients, it may
well be used for sicker patients that were not part of the original study. Doing a second
experiment is not always an option, and is often not ethical if there are demonstrable and
sizable eﬀects on a closely related population. Third, other things may change between
the experiment and the subsequent adoption that aﬀects the eﬃcacy of the treatment.
Again, this is unavoidable in practice.
In economic applications the issue of external validity is considerably more severe.
In many biomedical treatments the eﬀects are through relatively stable biological mech-
anisms that generalize to other populations. A vaccine for a particular strain of HIV
that prevents infection in the US has a high likelihood of working for the same strain in
Africa as well. In contrast, an educational reform that is found to raise test scores in
England is unlikely to be directly applicable to the US given the diﬀerences in educational
institutions and practices.
It may be helpful to put some more structure on this problem.14 Suppose we have
a number of units. To be speciﬁc I will refer to them as states. We are interested in
the eﬀect of an intervention, e.g., putting a price cap into place at p1 versus at p0, on
demand for a particular commodity. For ease of exposition let us assume that p1−p0 = 1.
Let the expected diﬀerence in demand, at the two potential values for the price cap, be
denoted by θs, indexed by state s. States may diﬀer in the expected eﬀect, because they
diﬀer in terms of institutions, or because they diﬀer in terms of population composition.
Let us denote the relevant characteristics of the states by Xs, and for purposes of this
discussion, let us assume we observe Xs.
Now suppose we have a model for the household level demand function:
Di = β0 + β1 · p + β2 · Ii · p + εi,
where Di is household level demand, Ii is household income, and εi are unobserved
diﬀerences between households. The parameters β are structural parameters, common
14This discussion is partly based on conversations with Abhijit Banerjee and Sendhil Mullainathan.
[22]to all states. Given this model, the diﬀerence in expected demand in state s if the price
is ﬁxed at p1 versus p0 is
θs = E[D|S = s,P = p1] − E[D|S = s,P = p0] = β1 + β2 · E[I|S = s].
Let Xs = E[I|S = s] be average income in state s, so that we can write
θs = g(Xs,β) = β1 + β2 · Xs.
Futhermore, suppose that our interest is solely in the diﬀerence in average outcomes in
California,
θca = g(Xca,β).
Now consider the case where we have data from an experiment in Tennessee, where
randomly selected individuals were faced with a price of p1, and others with a price of
p0. Thus, with a suﬃciently large sample, we would learn from the Tennessee experiment
the value of θtn = g(Xtn,β).
Suppose we also have data from an observational study from Connecticut. Inthis state
we have a random sample of demand, income, and prices, (Di,Ii,Pi), for i = 1,...,N.
We may be concerned that in this state prices are endogenous, and so let us assume that
we also observe an instrument for price, Zi. If the instrument is valid, and conditional
on income both correlated with prices and uncorrelated with εi, this will allow us to
estimate the structural parameters β using two-stage-least-squares. Let us allow for the
possibility that the instrument is not valid, or more generally for misspeciﬁcation in the
structural model. In that case ˆ βct, the estimator for β based on Connecticut data, need
not be consistent for β. Let us denote the probability limit of the estimator by βct -
we index this probability limit by the state to capture the possibility that if the same
structural model was estimated in a diﬀerent state, the bias might well be diﬀerent.
The ﬁrst question now is how we would choose between two estimates of the inter-




versus the structural one, based on parameter estimates from Connecticut, combined




[23]In principle the choice between the two estimators would depend on the variation in
eﬀect θs, and in the variation in the pseudo-structural parameter βs. In the absence of
additional information, one may need to rely on prior beliefs. If one believes there is little
variation in θs, one might prefer ˆ θexp
ca . If one believed the structural model was close to
correctly speciﬁed, one would prefer ˆ θstruct
ca . Note the beneﬁts in this case of experimental
data: if the structural model had actually been estimated on experimental data, there
would be no bias, and βct would be equal to β, and thus g(Xca,βct) would be equal to
θca. That is not always the case. If the structural model was richer, a simple experiment
with randomly assigned prices would not necessarily pin down all structural parameters.
However, in general it will help pin down some combination of the structural parameters,
by forcing the model to ﬁt the experimental evidence.
The answer to the ﬁrst question may also diﬀer if the experiment in Tennesee focused
on a question that diﬀered from that in California. If the experiment in Tennessee
involved randomly assigning prices of p2 and p3, rather than the price levels that enter
into the California question, p0 and p1, it may be diﬃcult to estimate θca from the
Tennessee results. This would not pose any conceptual problems from the structural
model perspective.
A second question is what one would do if one had both the experimental evidence
from Tennessee and the observational data from Connecticut. In that case one could, in
the spirit of the Lalonde (1986) evaluation of econometric evaluation methods, compare
the experimental estimate for Tennesee, θtn, with the structural one based on Connecticut
estimates, ˆ θstruct
tn = g(Xtn,βct). The comparison of θtn and ˆ θstruct
tn reﬂects on the adequacy
of the structural model. If the structural model passes the test, there is a stronger case
for using the structural model to predict the eﬀect of the intervention in California. If
the prediction fails, however, the conclusion is that the structural model is not adequate,
and thus invalidates ˆ θstruct
ca . This test does not reﬂect in any way on the experimental
estimate ˆ θexp
ca .
A third question concerns the information content of additional experiments. With
two or more experiments we would be able to update our beliefs on the amount of
variation in θs. It obviously would not help much if we did the second experiment in
a state very similar to Tennessee, but if we did the second experiment in a state very
diﬀerent from Tennessee, and ideally more similar to California, we would likely learn
[24]much about the amount of variation in θs. If we have detailed information on Xs, having
a substantial number of experiments may enable us to approximate the function g(x;β)
without directly estimating β, simply ﬁtting a ﬂexible functional form to E[θs|Xs] =
g(Xs). If we can approximate this function accurately, we would be able to predict the
eﬀect of the intervention in California. In this case one could also incorporate diﬀerent
experiments, e.g., those involving other price caps. If there is any choice, one should do
the experiments in a wide range of settings, that is, in the current example, in states
with diﬀerent Xs. The analyses by Card, Kluve and Weber (2009), Hotz, Imbens and
Mortimer (2005), Kremer and Holla (2008) and Duﬂo nand Chattopadhyay (2004) ﬁt
into this framework.
The fourth question concerns the beneﬁts of multiple observational studies. This is
not quite so clear. In many cases one would expect that repeated observational studies in
diﬀerent locations would have similar biases, generated through similar selection mecha-
nisms. Finding that multiple observational studies lead to the same results is therefore
not necessarily informative. To get a handle on the bias, the diﬀerence βs −β, we would
need observational study from states that do not have the same biases as the ﬁrst state,
Connecticut. Identifying such states may be more diﬃcult than ﬁnding a state with po-
tentially diﬀerent eﬀects θs: it may well be that the biases in observational studies would
be similar in all states, arising from the same selection mechanisms.
7 Conclusion
Deaton oﬀers a critical appraisal of the methodologies currently in fashion in development
economics. He argues that randomized experiments have no special role in the hierarchy
of evidence, and, as do Heckman and Urzua, argues somewhat presumptuously that
instrumental variables methods do not answer interesting questions. He suggests moving
towards more theory-based studies, and away from randomized and natural experiments.
In these comments I take issue with some of these positions, and caution against his
recommendations. The causal or design-based literature, going back to the work in labor
economics by Angrist, Card, Krueger and others, and the current experimental literature
in development economics, including work by Duﬂo, Banerjee and Kremer, has greatly
improved the standards of empirical work by emphasizing internal validity and clarifying
[25]the nature of identifying assumptions. Although it would be regrettable if this trend led
researchers to avoid questions that cannot be answered through randomized or natural
experiments, it is important not to lose track of the great strides made by this literature
towards improving the credibility of empirical work.
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